The Future of Memory: Remembering, Imagining, and the Brain by Schacter, Daniel L. et al.
 
The Future of Memory: Remembering, Imagining, and the Brain
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Schacter, Daniel L., Donna Rose Addis, Demis Hassabis,
Victoria C. Martin, R. Nathan Spreng, and Karl K. Szpunar. 2012.
“The Future of Memory: Remembering, Imagining, and the
Brain.” Neuron 76 (4) (November): 677-694.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001.
Published Version doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001
Accessed February 19, 2015 1:49:24 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11688796
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP  1 
Schacter, D.K., Addis, D.R., Hassabis, D., Martin, V.C.,  Spreng, R.N., & Szpunar, K.K. (2012). 
The future of memory: Remembering, imagining, and the brain. Neuron, 76, 677-694. 
 
The Future of Memory: Remembering, Imagining, and the Brain 
 
Daniel L. Schacter
1*, Donna Rose Addis
2, Demis Hassabis
3, Victoria C. Martin
2, R. Nathan 
Spreng
4, and Karl K. Szpunar
1 
 
1Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA 
2School of Psychology and Centre for Brain Research, The University of Auckland, Auckland 
1142, New Zealand 
 
3Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London, WC1N 3AR, 
UK  
 
4Laboratory of Brain and Cognition, Department of Human Development, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA 
 
*Correspondence: dls@wjh.harvard.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2 
 
 
      Abstract 
During the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in research examining the role of 
memory in imagination and future thinking. This work has revealed striking similarities between 
remembering the past and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a 
common brain network underlies both memory and imagination. Here we discuss a number of 
key points that have emerged during recent years, focusing in particular on the importance of 
distinguishing between temporal and non-temporal factors in analyses of memory and 
imagination, the nature of differences between remembering the past and imagining the future, 
the identification of component processes that comprise the default network supporting memory-
based simulations, and the finding that this network can couple flexibly with other networks to 
support complex goal-directed simulations. This growing area of research has broadened our 
conception of memory by highlighting the many ways in which memory supports adaptive 
functioning.   3 
Introduction 
During the past century, memory research has focused on a variety of key issues and topics that 
can be said to constitute the conceptual core of the field. According to a recent volume devoted 
to delineating core concepts in memory research (Roediger et al., 2007), they include encoding, 
consolidation, retrieval, forgetting, plasticity, transfer, context, and memory systems, among 
others. In 2007, several articles appeared that examined a topic – the role of memory in 
imagination and future thinking – that was nowhere to be found in the comprehensive volume 
published by Roediger et al. during that same year. Two of these articles combined functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with novel behavioral methods to reveal striking overlap in 
the brain activity associated with remembering actual past experiences and imagining or 
simulating possible future experiences (Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). Comparable 
levels of activity were observed during both remembering and imagining in regions including 
medial temporal and frontal lobes, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, and lateral 
parietal and temporal areas.  
These studies suggested that a common “core” network that includes the above-
mentioned regions, commonly referred to as the default network (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001), 
underlies both remembering and imagining (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007a). In 
a related vein, an investigation of amnesic patients with hippocampal damage revealed 
significant impairments when these patients were asked to imagine novel experiences (Hassabis 
et al., 2007b). These empirical studies were accompanied by review and theoretical papers that 
emphasized the links among remembering the past, imagining the future, and engaging in related 
forms of mental simulation (Bar, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; 
Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b; Schacter et al., 2007a). At the   4 
close of 2007, Science included the aforementioned neuroimaging and neuropsychological 
studies of memory and imagination on their list of the top ten discoveries of the year (Science, 21 
December, 2007, pp. 1848-1849). 
  Although research concerning the role of memory in imagination and future thinking 
seemed to burst on the scientific scene in 2007, a variety of earlier articles had in fact already 
laid some of the conceptual and empirical foundations for this work. Evidence that amnesic 
patients have problems imagining the future was first reported by Tulving (1985) and later by 
Klein et al. (2002). In a positron emission tomography (PET) study, Okuda et al. (2003) asked 
participants to think about past and future events, and observed considerable overlap in the 
activated brain regions. Similarities between remembering past events and imagining future 
events had also been documented in a study of depressed patients (Williams et al., 1996) as well 
as in behavioral studies of healthy individuals (e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 
2006; Spreng & Levine, 2006; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005), and were explored in experiments 
that investigated whether non-human animals can project into the past or future (e.g., Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998; Emery & Clayton, 2001). Social psychologists had published studies 
concerning the role of mental simulations in predicting future experiences and the role of 
memory in guiding such simulations (e.g., Morewedge et al., 2005). Moreover, several review 
papers had discussed relevant theoretical and conceptual issues (Atance & O’Neill, 2001, 2005; 
Clayton et al., 2003; Ingvar, 1979, 1985; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1985, 2002a, 
2002b, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997). Building on these foundational studies and analyses, the 
papers published in 2007 served to galvanize scientific interest in the relations between 
remembering the past and imagining the future, as evidenced by the rapidly growing number of 
papers on the topic that have been published since.   5 
  The main purpose of the present article is to review some of the progress that has been 
made since 2007 (our review will focus exclusively on studies with human subjects, but relevant 
recent work has also been conducted with non-human animals; for reviews, see Cheke & 
Clayton, 2010; Crystal, 2012; Roberts, 2012; van der Meer et al., 2012). Specifically, we have 
organized the literature with respect to four key points that have emerged from research reported 
during the past five years: 1) it is important to distinguish between temporal and non-temporal 
factors when conceptualizing processes involved in remembering the past and imagining the 
future; 2) despite impressive similarities between remembering the past and imagining the 
future, theoretically important differences have also emerged; 3) the component processes that 
comprise the default network supporting memory-based simulations are beginning to be 
identified; and 4) this network can couple flexibly with other networks to support complex goal-
directed simulations. We will conclude by considering briefly several other emerging points that 
will be important to expand on in future research.  
Note that although the focus of our review will be to elucidate recent advances in 
understanding the neural mechanisms of memory-based simulations, numerous purely behavioral 
studies have also shed light on the topic and we will consider those data where appropriate. 
Throughout the review, we will use the concepts of imagination or “imagining the future” and 
simulation or “simulating the future” in a roughly interchangeable manner. Schacter et al. (2008, 
p. 42), following Taylor and Schneider (1989), defined future simulations as imaginative 
constructions of hypothetical events or scenarios, and we will adopt this usage in the present 
review. Further, most of the review will focus on the contributions of episodic memory – 
memory for specific happenings in one’s personal past (Tulving, 1983, 2002a) – but we will 
conclude by discussing the contribution of semantic memory (i.e., general knowledge) to   6 
imagination and future thinking.   
Understanding the Relation between Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future 
Requires Distinguishing between Temporal and Non-temporal Factors 
As noted earlier, one of the findings responsible for the upsurge of interest in the relation 
between remembering the past and imagining the future comes from functional neuroimaging 
studies that revealed activation of a common brain network during these two forms of mental 
activity. On the basis of this observation, Okuda et al. (2003) concluded that: “thinking of the 
future is closely related to retrospective memory (2003, p. 1369)”; Addis et al. (2007, p. 1363) 
stated that “This striking neural overlap…confirms that the episodic system contributes 
importantly to imagining the future”; and Szpunar et al. (2007, p.642) observed that “Our results 
offer insight into the fundamental and little-studied capacity of vivid mental projection of oneself 
in the future.” 
These conclusions seem straightforward enough given that overlap in brain activity was 
observed when people remembered past events or imagined future events. And those conclusions 
fit nicely with the idea that the ability to project oneself into the past and future reflects a 
capacity for “mental time travel” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Tulving, 1983, 2002a, 
2005). However, as noted by Addis et al. (2009a), the distinction between “past events” and 
“future events” in these studies is confounded with the distinction between “remembering” and 
“imagining”. While remembered events must refer to the past, activity attributed to “future 
events” could just as well be attributed to “imagined events”, irrespective of whether those 
events refer to the future, the past, or the present (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). These 
considerations raise the question of whether experiments that examine the relation between 
remembering the past and imagining the future specifically inform our understanding of the   7 
relation between past and future, as claimed in the aforementioned studies, or whether they bear 
on our understanding of the relation between memory and imagination, irrespective of the 
involvement of mental time travel. 
Evidence for a non-temporal perspective  Several kinds of observations favor a non-
temporal perspective. For example, Buckner and Carroll (2007) pointed out that activation of 
default network regions is observed not only when individuals remember the past and imagine 
the future, but also when they engage in related forms of mental simulation that involve taking 
the perspective of others (without an explicit requirement for mental time travel), and also during 
spatial navigation (see Spreng et al., 2009). Similarly, Hassabis et al. (2007a) reported activation 
of several default network regions in an fMRI study in which participants were instructed to 
imagine novel scenes, without a specific requirement for mental time travel into the future. 
Hassabis et al. (2007b) reported deficits on the same task in amnesic patients with medial 
temporal lobe damage, and Romero and Moscovitch (2012) have recently reported that such 
patients exhibit deficits on a related task involving construction of a novel event from word cues, 
without an explicit requirement for mental time travel. Addis et al. (2009a) found nearly identical 
patterns of default network activity when individuals were asked to imagine events that might 
occur in the future or might have occurred in the past (see Figure 1), suggesting that previous 
observations of default network activity during imagining the future are not specifically 
associated with the prospective components of the task.  
de Vito et al. (2012a) reported behavioral evidence favoring a non-temporal perspective. 
They asked participants to imagine themselves carrying out specific future activities in familiar 
or unfamiliar settings, or to imagine themselves carrying out activities in familiar settings with 
no reference to a particular time. Participants described each imagined episode, and the   8 
experimenters recorded and later transcribed these protocols. Participants provided subjective 
ratings concerning the clarity and vividness of the imagined episodes, and the experimenters 
performed objective ratings concerning the amount of detail represented in the protocols that 
participants provided. To accomplish this latter objective, the experimenters used a scoring 
procedure known as the Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002) that distinguishes 
between “internal” or episodic details present in a protocol (e.g., details concerning people, 
locations, and actions) and “external” or semantic details (e.g., facts and evaluative comments).  
Participants’ subjective ratings revealed greater vividness for future episodes that were imagined 
in familiar settings than in unfamiliar settings, thereby replicating earlier results (Arnold et al., 
2011a; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008), and objective data from the Autobiographical Interview 
showed significantly more internal details for episodes imagined in familiar than unfamiliar 
settings. By contrast, there were no differences between future episodes and atemporal episodes 
on either the subjective or objective measures. A second experiment revealed that imagined 
future events that are relevant to the self were associated with a stronger subjective “feeling of 
experiencing” than imagined future events that were not relevant to the self, and that self-
relevant events contained more internal details than self-irrelevant episodes. But future self-
relevant and atemporal self-relevant events did not differ on either of these measures. Thus, there 
was no evidence for differences between future and atemporal events on subjective and objective 
measures that were sensitive enough to reveal differences between familiar vs. unfamiliar 
settings and self-relevant vs. self-irrelevant events.  
  Evidence for a temporal perspective  The foregoing results are consistent with the 
idea that future and atemporal imagined events are represented similarly, but other recent data 
indicate differences between temporal and atemporal imagined scenarios. For example, de Vito   9 
et al. (2012b) report that patients with Parkinson’s disease exhibit deficits when asked to imagine 
future events, but perform normally when asked to imagine atemporal scenarios. Rendell et al. 
(in press), using a task based on previous work by Hassabis et al. (2007a, 2007b), found that 
older adults exhibited deficits when imagining future and atemporal scenarios compared with 
younger adults, but showed a significantly greater impairment for the future than the atemporal 
scenarios. Klein et al. (2010) demonstrated that encoding of new information benefits from 
creating imagined scenarios that involve planning for the future, but the same encoding benefit is 
not observed when people encode information by calling up past scenarios or imagining 
atemporal scenarios. Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) reported fMRI evidence that distinct regions 
within the default network were associated with imagining future scenarios involving oneself 
versus reflecting about oneself in the present. However, it is not clear that this contrast 
specifically isolated temporal factors, because as noted by the authors, the future and present 
conditions differed in other ways (e.g., greater use of mental imagery in the future self 
condition). 
Another recent fMRI study examined the neural basis of chronesthesia, or the capacity to 
be aware of subjective time (Tulving, 2002b; for related ideas, see Dalla Barba & Boissé, 2010; 
Szpunar, 2011). Chronesthesia is invoked whenever people remember the past or imagine the 
future, but isolating the cognitive processes or brain regions associated with chronesthesia 
requires an experimental design that controls for non-temporal cognitive activities. That is, an 
appropriate experimental paradigm should contrast tasks that involve chronesthesia (e.g., 
remembering the past, imagining the future) with a task that is matched to the past and future 
tasks on non-temporal features, such as imagining oneself interacting with people and locations, 
without requiring “movement” in subjective time. Nyberg et al. (2010) scanned participants   10 
using fMRI during experimental tasks that, they contended, require chronesthesia – remembering 
a recent short walk along a familiar route or imagining a future short walk along the same route. 
Brain activity during these tasks was compared with activity during a matched task that, 
according to the authors, does not require chronesthesia: participants were instructed to take a 
mental walk through the same route in the present moment, without any thoughts about specific 
personal past or future happenings. Participants were given extensive training in performing the 
key tasks and the authors tried to equate the tasks for mental contents – they took place in the 
same setting and did not involve interactions with other people – in an attempt to isolate brain 
activity associated with chronesthesia by contrasting the remembering and imagining tasks with 
the mental walk task. Nyberg et al. (2010) reported that left lateral parietal cortex, as well as left 
frontal cortex, cerebellum, and thalamus were preferentially engaged as participants thought 
about taking walks in the past or future as compared to taking the same walk in the present 
moment. By contrast, many default network regions that had shown increased activity during 
remembering the past and imagining the future in previous studies (e.g., medial temporal lobe, 
medial prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial cortex) did not show preferential activation when thinking 
about taking walks in the past and future tasks as compared with the present moment. Although 
interpretation of these findings depends critically on the extent to which the training given to 
participants indeed allowed them to remain in the present moment during the mental walk task, 
they suggest that only some regions are specifically related to chronesthesia or mental time travel 
(for related evidence, see Arzy et al., 2008, 2009). 
  Further highlighting a possible role for temporal factors, recent behavioral studies have 
revealed individual differences in the feeling of experiencing simulations of future events 
(Arnold et al., 2011b; D’Argembeau et al., 2010a; Quoidbach et al., 2008) along with   11 
asymmetries in the way that people think about the past and the future. For instance, Van Boven 
and Caruso and their colleagues have shown that people experience more intense emotions when 
they anticipate future experiences than when they retrospect about past experiences, either actual 
or hypothetical (Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso et al., in press; Van Boven and 
Ashworth, 2007). Nonetheless, an in depth understanding of the brain bases of subjective 
experiences associated with mental time travel awaits future research. 
Taken together with the studies considered earlier in this section, we conclude that 
studies of remembering the past and imagining the future can potentially inform our 
understanding of the relation between memory and imagination, independent of temporal factors 
(cf., Eacott & Easton, 2012), but can also inform our understanding of mental time travel or 
chronesthesia, when possible differences between memory and imagination are held constant. 
However, distinguishing between these factors requires careful experimental designs that 
precisely target specific processes of interest. Simple comparisons between remembering the past 
and imagining the future cannot alone disentangle the contributions of temporal and non-
temporal factors. 
Despite Impressive Similarities between Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future, 
Theoretically Important Differences are Beginning to Emerge 
Neural and cognitive similarities: A brief summary  As noted earlier, 
neuroimaging studies have revealed that when people remember the past or imagine the future, 
similar levels of activation are observed in regions including medial temporal and frontal lobes, 
posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, and lateral parietal and temporal areas (Addis et al., 
2007, 2009a, 2011b; Botzung et al., 2008; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter 
et al., 2007a; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Szpunar et al., 2007; Szpunar, 2010;   12 
Viard et al., 2011). We also noted that these regions overlap substantially with the default 
network (Raichle et al., 2001; for reviews, see Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012), 
which was first identified in neuroimaging studies on the basis of activation increases in the 
above-noted brain regions for experimental participants in passive rest conditions compared with 
the experimental conditions of principal interest in which they performed attention demanding or 
goal-directed cognitive tasks (Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). Given recent studies 
showing default network activity when people remember the past or imagine the future, it now 
seems likely that during passive rest conditions in earlier studies, participants were engaged in 
remembering past experiences or imagining future experiences. Indeed, thought-sampling 
experiments have revealed that participants report frequent thoughts about past and future events 
during rest blocks (Andreasen et al., 1995; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; Stawarczyk et al., 
2011).  
Consistent with the finding that both remembering and imagining are associated with 
activity in the default network, many studies have demonstrated that the cognitive processes 
associated with memory and simulation show commonalities. For example, D’Argembeau & van 
der Linden (2004; see also Arnold et al., 2011a; D'Argembeau et al., 2011; Trope & Liberman, 
2003) reported that positive events were associated with increased subjective ratings of re-
experiencing for past events and “pre-experiencing” for future events. They also found that 
temporally close events in either the past or the future included more sensory and contextual 
details, and greater feelings of re-experiencing and pre-experiencing, than did temporally distant 
events. D’Argembeau and van der Linden (2006) showed that individual differences in imagery 
ability and emotion regulation strategies have similar effects on both past and future events, 
whereas D’Argembeau et al. (2012) demonstrated that individual differences in the construction   13 
of “self-defining memories” – past events of great importance that shape an individual’s sense of 
identity – are manifested similarly in the construction of self-defining future projections, i.e., 
imagined future events with great importance for self and identity. Brown et al. (2012) recently 
reported that individuals who are led to believe that they can cope effectively with stress (high 
“self-efficacy”) remember past events and imagine future events in greater episodic detail than 
do individuals who are led to believe that they have difficulties coping with stress (low self-
efficacy). Anderson et al. (2012) showed that remembering the past and imagining the future 
depend similarly on distinct retrieval pathways, one characterized as “direct” or automatic and 
the other characterized as “controlled” or effortful. Spreng and Levine (2006; see also, Spreng & 
Levine, in press) reported similarities in the temporal distributions of past and future 
autobiographical events provided by college students, middle-aged and older adults. Several 
studies have found that the developmental trajectories of reporting and making judgments about 
past and future events are similar, as children become able to answer questions about their own 
personal past and future between the ages of three and five years (Busby and Suddendorf, 2005; 
Hayne & Imuta, 2011; Hudson et al., 2011; Russell et al., 2010; Suddendorf, 2010b; for review, 
see Suddendorf, 2010a). These findings are complemented by a recent report indicating that 
some measures of functional connectivity within the default network in children and adolescents 
are related to the qualitative features of memories and to some extent future imaginations (Østby 
et al., in press). 
Studies using the Autobiographical Interview procedure (Levine et al., 2002) discussed 
earlier have documented that older adults produce fewer internal or episodic details than younger 
adults both when remembering the past and imagining the future, along with an increased 
number of external details for both remembering and imagining (Addis et al., 2008, 2010, 2011b;   14 
Gaesser et al., 2011; Sheldon et al., 2011; for review, see Schacter et al., in press). Similarly, 
studies of various neurological and psychopathological populations have documented parallel 
reductions in the episodic specificity of past and future events in patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease (Addis et al., 2009b), mild cognitive impairment (Gamboz et al., 2010b), amnesic 
syndrome (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011; 
Tulving, 1985), depression (Williams et al., 1996), schizophrenia (D’Argembeau et al., 2008a), 
autism (Lind & Bowler, 2010), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Brown et al., in press).   
  These converging findings have led investigators to propose theoretical ideas that emphasize 
the tight links between memory and simulation. For instance, Schacter and Addis (2007a, 2007b, 
2009) proposed the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which connects work on future 
simulation with “constructive” aspects of memory, such as memory distortions and errors, by 
emphasizing memory’s role in simulating future events (for related ideas, see Suddendorf & 
Busby, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). The general idea that memory is a constructive 
process of integrating bits and pieces of information, rather than a literal replay of the past, dates 
to the pioneering work of Bartlett (1932), and has been developed by a variety of investigators 
who have demonstrated the occurrence of memory distortions and theorized about their basis 
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Johnson et al., 1993; Loftus, 1979, 2003; Schacter et al., 1998; 
Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). A longstanding question concerns whether the constructive nature of 
memory serves any adaptive function (Bartlett, 1932; Hardt et al., 2010; Howe, 2011; Newman 
& Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, 2001; Schacter et al., 2011). The constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis states that a critical function of a constructive memory system is to make information 
available in a flexible manner for simulation of future events. Specifically, the hypothesis holds 
that past and future events draw on similar information and rely on similar underlying processes,   15 
and that the episodic memory system supports the construction of future events by extracting and 
recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel event. While this adaptive function 
allows past information to be used flexibly when simulating alternative future scenarios, the 
flexibility of memory may also result in vulnerability to imagination-induced memory errors, 
where imaginary events are confused with actual events (for further discussion, see Schacter et 
al., 2011; Schacter, 2012). Note that the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis does not 
place much theoretical emphasis on temporal processes such as mental time travel (Suddendorf 
& Corballis, 1997, 2007; Tulving, 2002a, 2002b), but instead emphasizes processes involved in 
linking together distinct elements of an episode, in particular relational processing capacities that 
have been linked with hippocampal function (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001) and that may 
contribute to the construction of simulated events.  
  Hassabis and Maguire (2007, 2009; see also Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b; Summerfield et 
al., 2010) argued that a process of “scene construction” is critically involved in both memory and 
imagination. Scene construction entails retrieving and integrating perceptual, semantic, and 
contextual information into a coherent spatial context. Scene construction is held to be more 
complex than “simple” visual imagery for individual objects (Kosslyn et al., 2001) because it 
relies on binding together disparate types of information into a coherent whole, and likely 
involves processes mediated by several regions within the default network, most notably the 
medial temporal lobe (Hassabis et al., 2007a). Scene construction is thought to be a critical 
component of both memory and imagination as mental simulations, whether of the past, future or 
purely fictional, because they are all usually framed within a spatial context (Hassabis and 
Maguire, 2007). Buckner and Carroll (2007) contended that the default network underpins “self 
projection” processes by which past experiences are used to imagine perspectives and events   16 
beyond those in the immediate environment. In addition to the default network’s role in 
remembering the past and imagining the future, they argued that it serves an even more general 
function, extending to diverse tasks that require mental simulation of alternative perspectives, 
such as thinking about the mental states of others (but see Rosenbaum et al., 2007). This 
perspective places emphasis on attempting to understand what is common to the various 
capacities that are linked to the default network (i.e., self projection), and as noted earlier, 
conceives of mental time travel as just one form of disengaging from the immediate 
environment. 
   Evidence for differences  A key point for the present purposes is that the above views 
and related ideas (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007) have been formulated largely on the 
basis of evidence showing commonalities between remembering the past and imagining the 
future. However, it has become clear during the past few years that these impressive similarities 
are accompanied by important differences. Some such differences were reported in the initial 
neuroimaging studies comparing past and future events. For example, Okuda et al. (2003) and 
Addis et al. (2007) both reported greater neural activity in frontopolar regions and the 
hippocampus when participants imagined future events compared with remembering past events. 
In the Addis et al. (2007) study, participants pressed a button when they first generated a past or 
future event in response to a word cue (the “construction” phase) and then mentally elaborated 
on the generated events (the “elaboration” phase). Increased activity for future events emerged 
primarily during the initial construction phase, but a subsequent analysis of the elaboration phase 
data (Addis & Schacter, 2008) revealed additional differences, most notably in the hippocampal 
region. Addis and Schacter (2008) analyzed the relation between neural activity and subjective 
ratings that participants provided concerning the amount of detail comprising past and future   17 
events. This analysis revealed that activity in the left posterior hippocampus was associated with 
the amount of detail comprising both past and future events, whereas left anterior hippocampus 
responded selectively to the amount of detail comprising future events. 
Schacter and Addis (2007a, 2009) have attempted to accommodate such differences in 
discussions of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, proposing that the finding of 
greater neural activity for future relative to past events reflects the more extensive constructive 
processes required by imagining future events relative to remembering past events. That is, 
whereas both past and future event tasks require the retrieval of information from memory, 
imagining future experiences – but not remembering past experiences – requires that details 
extracted from past experiences are flexibly recombined into a novel event. More recently, 
additional factors have been suggested as explaining the increased hippocampal activation for 
future events, including the fact that imagining future events requires the generation of new 
mental representations, resulting in a greater degree of encoding than that for previously stored 
information (Martin et al. 2011). Moreover, the increased hippocampal activation for future 
relative to past events is only seen in imagined future events that are specific (as opposed to 
general or routine events), which has been proposed to reflect that highly detailed and specific 
events require the formation of more novel associations among the event details (Addis et al., 
2011a). 
  Behavioral studies have also uncovered important differences. Storm & Jobe (2012) 
reported that the phenomenon of retrieval-induced forgetting – when retrieving information can 
lead to impaired subsequent recall of related information – occurs when retrieving actual 
autobiographical memories, but not when retrieving imagined future (or imagined past) 
experiences. Several behavioral studies have revealed that remembered events are associated   18 
with greater retrieval of sensory-perceptual details than are imagined future events 
(D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; Bernsten & Bohn, 2010; Gamboz et al., 2010a; 
McDonough & Gallo, 2010) or imagined events in general (Johnson et al., 1988), whereas 
imagined future events (or imagined events in general) are more difficult to generate than 
remembered events and hence are associated with more extensive cognitive operations 
(D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988; McDonough & Gallo, 2010). 
Along similar lines, Anderson and Dewhurst (2009) reported that imagined future experiences 
contain less specific information than do remembered past experiences. Evidence from the 
Autobiographical Interview likewise indicates that remembered past events contain more internal 
or episodic details than do imagined future events (Addis et al., 2008, 2010) or imagined past 
events (Addis et al., 2010; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012 ).  
Related fMRI evidence comes from a study by Addis et al. (2009a) in which participants 
remembered person-location-object memories and also imagined events that might occur in the 
future, or might have occurred in the past, that consisted of person-location-object scenarios 
recombined from actual memories. All three conditions were associated with activity in the 
default network, but differences were also observed: activity in posterior visual cortices such as 
fusiform, lingual and occipital gyri and cuneus, as well as parahippocampal gyrus and posterior 
hippocampus, was preferentially associated with remembering actual events as compared with 
imagining future or past events. Addis et al. (2009a) suggested that the association of posterior 
visual cortices with memory for actual experiences, as distinct from imaginary experiences, 
reflects reactivation of sensory-perceptual details during memory retrieval, which recruits the 
neural regions involved in the original processing of the remembered information. Importantly, 
the behavioral data from this study revealed that remembered events were rated as more detailed   19 
than imagined events, whereas in the earlier Addis et al. (2007) study that did not produce 
evidence of greater activity for remembering the past compared with imagining the future, level 
of rated detail for remembered and imagined events was indistinguishable (see also, Hassabis et 
al., 2007a). Nonetheless, some neural differences between past and future events have been 
reported under conditions in which most phenomenological properties of past and future events 
did not differ, including greater activations of visual regions for remembered past events as 
compared with imagined future events (Weiler et al., 2010a).  
Greater activity for remembering the past relative to imagining the future has also been 
demonstrated in the hippocampus (Abraham et al., 2008a; Botzung et al., 2008, Weiler et al., 
2010b). The paradigms in these studies share a common feature: the future events were pre-
imagined prior to scanning, and therefore during the fMRI paradigm, participants were not 
constructing a novel future event, but instead re-imagining the scenario. There is evidence to 
suggest that simulation-related activity in the hippocampus reduces with repeated simulation of 
future events (V. van Mulukom et al., submitted for publication; for related evidence from 
studies of memory, see Svoboda & Levine, 2009), possibly to a level lower than that associated 
with remembering, which would result in a past greater than future effect. Another possibility is 
that when future events are pre-imagined (and then re-imagined in the scanner), the participants 
are remembering a representation of the future simulation that, as noted earlier, is typically less 
detailed relative to previously experienced events. 
Complementing the above data, recent neuropsychological studies of lesion patients also 
provide evidence for differences between remembering the past and imagining the future. 
Berryhill et al. (2010) examined the autobiographical memory of two patients with bilateral 
posterior parietal lesions and five patients with assorted unilateral prefrontal lesions using the   20 
Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002) and a “constructed experiences” task based on 
previous work by Hassabis et al. (2007a, 2007b), in which patients were asked to imagine 
fictitious scenes (“Imagine yourself in a museum”) or self-relevant future events (“Imagine the 
next holiday”). The parietal lesion patients showed impaired performance on both the memory 
and constructed experience tasks (e.g., they generated fewer specific details than did controls), 
whereas the prefrontal lesion patients were impaired on the constructed experience task but not 
on the autobiographical memory task. Related to these findings, in the de Vito et al. (2012b) 
study of patients with Parkinson’s disease noted earlier, it was found that Parkinson’s patients 
showed a significant reduction in internal or episodic details when imagining future events but 
not when remembering past events (as noted earlier, these same patients failed to show a deficit 
in atemporal imagining), and that the deficit was related to performance on tests assessing frontal 
lobe function.  
Several other recent patient studies provide further evidence that remembering the past 
and imagining the future can be dissociated. Semantic dementia patients, who have severe 
deficits in semantic memory with relative preservation of episodic memory consequent to 
atrophy of the anterior temporal lobes, showed a reduction relative to controls in internal 
(episodic) details on the Autobiographical Interview when imagining the future, together with a 
preserved ability to generate internal details when remembering the past (Irish, et al., 2012; see 
Figure 2). Based on these findings, Irish et al. (2012) argued that simulating novel future events, 
in contrast to remembering past events, relies on general conceptual knowledge that provides a  
“scaffolding into which specific episodic details can be integrated (p. 2187).” Consistent with 
these observations, Duval et al. (2012) also reported that semantic dementia patients exhibited 
impaired episodic future thinking despite intact episodic recall. Weiler et al. (2011) reported a   21 
similar pattern in two patients with thalamic lesions, who exhibited intact episodic memory 
together with an impaired ability to imagine fictitious and impersonal events and a somewhat 
milder deficit in imagining personal future events. 
Finally, although we noted earlier that a number of studies of amnesic patients have 
revealed parallel deficits in remembering the past and imagining the future or imagining novel 
scenes or events (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 
2011; Romero & Moscovitch, 2012; Tulving, 1985), not all such studies show this effect. For 
example, in a study that used the Autobiographical Interview as well as measures of scene 
construction based on prior work by Hassabis et al. (2007b), Squire et al. (2010) reported that 
amnesic patients with damage to the hippocampus showed an intact ability to create detailed 
imaginary future events and suggested that findings of imagination impairments in previous 
cases reflect the presence of extra-hippocampal damage (for further discussion of this point, see 
Maguire & Hassabis, 2011; Squire et al., 2011). However, the hippocampal patients in the Squire 
et al. (2010) study exhibited only mild levels of retrograde amnesia; they were able to retrieve 
events from the remote past normally and showed only a mild, non-significant deficit for 
retrieving memories from the recent past. Thus, as noted by Addis and Schacter (2012), the 
results of this study could also be interpreted as support for the idea that a relatively intact ability 
to retrieve much of the past can provide a basis for imagining the future, even when the 
hippocampus is damaged. Squire et al. (2010) also reported that the severely amnesic patient 
E.P., who is characterized by extensive medial temporal lobe damage, showed an intact ability to 
imagine future events. However, although E.P. showed impaired recent autobiographical 
memory he exhibited intact remote autobiographical memory, perhaps contributing to his ability 
to imagine future personal experiences.   22 
Several other cases have been reported in which hippocampal damage significantly 
impaired remembering but not imagining. For instance, Maguire and colleagues reported that 
adult amnesic patients who had sustained hippocampal damage early in life are able to construct 
imaginary scenarios (Maguire et al., 2010; Hurley et al., 2011; but see, Kwan et al., 2010), and 
they also report normal imagination abilities in children with hippocampal damage and 
autobiographical memory deficits (Cooper et al., 2011). These findings suggest that the time of 
onset of the amnesia could be an important factor: perhaps patients who suffer early damage 
develop other strategies or rely either on residual episodic memories or detailed semantic 
information to construct imaginary scenarios (Cooper et al., 2011). Note also that although 
Hassabis et al. (2007b) reported that four adult amnesic patients had severe difficulties imagining 
scenarios, they did report that one adult amnesic could perform their scene construction task 
normally. They observed that this patient is characterized by the presence of residual right 
hippocampal tissue, and have recently reported fMRI evidence showing activation of the right 
hippocampus when the patient performed a scene construction task (Mullally et al., 2012; see 
also, Maguire et al., 2010). Overall, it seems clear that there are some cases in which 
hippocampal damage differentially affects memory and imagination, but it is not yet well 
understood why differential effects are observed in some cases while parallel effects are 
observed in others.  
At a more general level, given that both cognitive and neural differences between 
remembering and imagining have been established, it will be important for theoretical accounts 
to attempt to explain these differences. Ideas such as scene construction (Hassabis & Maguire, 
2007, 2009) and self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) have focused on explaining what is 
common to remembering, imagining, and related processes. We noted earlier that the   23 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b, 2009) addresses 
some of the differences that have been documented (see also Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), but 
developing more detailed theoretical accounts aimed at handling the differences between 
remembering and imagining reviewed in this section constitutes a critical task. 
Neuroimaging and Cognitive Studies are Beginning to Reveal the Component Structures 
and Processes that Support Memory-Based Simulations 
Demonstrations that similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future 
reflect the operation of a common network have led investigators to ask questions concerning the 
role played by specific regions within the network in both remembering and imagining: what 
specific processes are supported by individual default network structures?  
To test hypotheses concerning the roles of particular structures in component processes 
relevant to remembering and imagining, it is important to construct experimental designs that 
allow controlled manipulation of theoretically relevant task features. A study by Hassabis et al. 
(2007a) attempted to accomplish this objective. Participants were instructed either to construct 
fictitious experiences for the first time during fMRI scanning (e.g., imagining lying on a sandy 
beach), retrieve similar kinds of fictitious experiences that had been constructed a week prior to 
scanning, or recall recent episodic memories of actual experiences. All of these conditions were 
compared with a control condition involving imagining or recalling individual objects (as 
opposed to coherent scenes). Hassabis et al. (2007a) reasoned that regions activated similarly 
during all three experimental conditions relative to the control task are involved in the process of 
scene construction, whereas regions that were selectively active during recall of real 
autobiographical experiences are specifically related to episodic memory, above and beyond 
scene construction. Construction of novel scenes engaged a network that included hippocampus,   24 
parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial cortex and posterior parietal cortices, and these regions 
were all similarly active during recall of previously imagined scenes and recall of episodic 
memories (see Figure 3). By contrast, retrieving episodic memories of actual experiences, 
relative to the other two conditions, was associated with activity in anterior medial prefrontal 
cortex and posterior cingulate, which the authors linked with processes that support self-relevant 
processing (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Kelley et al., 2002) and perhaps mental time 
travel (e.g., Tulving, 2002a).  
Consistent with these observations, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) used both resting state 
measures of intrinsic connectivity and experimental manipulations to provide evidence for 
dissociable components of the default network. Intrinsic connectivity measures revealed a 
distinction between a dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) subsystem comprised of the 
dMPFC, lateral temporal cortex, temporoparietal junction, and temporal pole, and a medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, comprised of the ventral MPFC, hippocampal formation, 
parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and posterior inferior parietal lobule. Both 
subsystems were tightly connected to “hub” regions including anterior MPFC and posterior 
cingulate. Importantly, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) provided converging evidence from task-
based fMRI experiments that revealed functional characteristics of the two subsystems. The 
MTL subsystem was associated with memory-based scene construction when participants 
imagined future scenarios, whereas the dMPFC subsystem was preferentially linked with 
affective, self-referential activity as participants reflected on their current mental states. 
Likewise, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) found evidence for a link between the anterior MPFC 
and posterior cingulate “hub” regions and affective self-referential processes, generally in line 
with the findings from Hassabis et al. (2007a).   25 
These and related broad divisions between subsystems of the default network (see Addis 
et al., 2009a; Kim, 2012) should provide a basis for further refining our understanding of the 
contributions of individual regions within these subsystems. Several studies have already made 
progress in this regard. For example, Szpunar et al. (2009) manipulated the contextual familiarity 
of remembered and imagined scenarios. During fMRI scanning, participants remembered past 
events or imagined future events set in familiar contexts (e.g., their apartment). In addition, 
participants also imagined future events set in unfamiliar contexts (e.g., a jungle). Based on 
previous research discussed earlier (Szpunar et al., 2007), Szpunar et al. (2009) hypothesized that 
several posterior cortical regions, including parahippocampal cortex and posterior cingulate, 
would exhibit increased activity for familiar past and future settings, compared with unfamiliar 
future settings, and their results supported this hypothesis. Szpunar et al. (2009) interpreted these 
findings in light of work by Bar and colleagues (e.g., Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar, 2007) showing 
that both of these regions play a role in generating contextual associations based on past 
experience, which is important for both remembering the past and imagining the future. 
D’Argembeau et al. (2010b) focused on the self-referential aspect of episodic future 
thinking by using fMRI to examine brain activity when participants simulated future episodes 
that were related to their personal goals (e.g., moving into a new apartment in two months, 
getting married next summer) versus future events that were plausible and could be easily 
imagined, but were not related to the individual’s personal goals (e.g., buying a clock at the flea 
market in two months, taking a pottery lesson next summer). Each of these tasks was compared 
with a control condition in which participants imagined routine activities (e.g., taking a shower, 
commuting to school). D’Argembeau et al. (2010b) found that the act of imagining scenarios 
related to personal goals was associated with increased activity in ventral MPFC and posterior   26 
cingulate relative to imagining nonpersonal scenarios (see also Abraham et al., 2008a). Relating 
their findings to previous work linking MPFC with the process of tagging information as self-
relevant (e.g., Gusnard et al., 2001; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007; Northoff et al., 2006), the authors 
suggested that MPFC contributes to coding and evaluating the self-relevance of future 
simulations with respect to personal goals. In light of previous work discussed above linking the 
posterior cingulate to contextual aspects of simulations, D’Argembeau et al. (2010b) suggested 
that because scenarios involving personal goals likely involve more familiar contexts than those 
involving nonpersonal goals, posterior cingulate could contribute to the contextualization of self-
relevant simulations.  
Another approach to identifying components of the default network and their relation to 
specific features of future simulations involves repetition-related reductions in neural activity, 
known as repetition suppression or neural priming (Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Schacter et al., 
2007b). According to the logic of repetition suppression, if a particular region is involved in the 
initial processing of a specific feature of a simulation, then it should show reduced activity when 
that feature is repeated. In two recent experiments (K.K. Szpunar et al., submitted for 
publication), participants either imagined future social scenarios (e.g., interacting with a familiar 
person in a familiar location) or future nonsocial scenarios (e.g., interacting with a familiar 
object in a familiar location). The pattern of repetition effects suggested that medial prefrontal, 
posterior cingulate, temporal-parietal, and middle temporal cortices are specifically related to 
social scenarios, and also provided evidence linking simulations of people with medial prefrontal 
cortex, objects with inferior frontal and premotor cortices, and locations with posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial, parahippocampal, and lateral parietal cortices.  
These observations converge with data from another recent study in which participants 1)   27 
imagined scenarios in which they simulated the behavior of other people based on personality 
characteristics they had learned about the protagonists, who conformed to one of four different 
personality types; 2) imagined themselves in the scenarios; or 3) simply imagined an empty 
scene, i.e., a spatial context lacking people or events (D. Hassabis et al., submitted for 
publication). Compared with a control task in which participants counted syllables in a text cue, 
all three imagination tasks engaged the default network. Comparing common activity in the 
protagonist and self conditions with the empty scene conditions revealed increased activity in 
several regions previously implicated in processing of social scenarios, including dorsal and 
anterior MPFC, anterior temporal lobes, and posterior cingulate. A further analysis using 
multivariate pattern classification methods addressed the question of where in the brain 
personality characteristics of the protagonists are represented, revealing that anterior and dorsal 
MPFC reliably discriminated among the four protagonists.  
Overall, the studies reviewed in this section suggest a broad consensus emerging around 
the idea that regions including MPFC and posterior cingulate are differentially involved with self 
and social aspects of simulation, whereas regions including medial temporal lobe and 
retrosplenial cortex are differentially involved in memory-based scene construction.  
There is less consensus, however, concerning the precise role of the hippocampus in 
imagination and future thinking (for recent reviews, see Addis & Schacter, 2012; Buckner, 2010; 
Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, 2009; Schacter & Addis, 2009; Viard et al., 2012). As noted in the 
previous section, neuroimaging studies have revealed a variety of patterns, where hippocampal 
activity has been similarly related to remembering and imagining, greater for imagining than 
remembering, or greater for remembering than imagining. A recent activation likelihood 
estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies that have examined medial temporal   28 
lobe activity during remembering and imagining tasks suggests that such details as type of cue, 
task, and specificity of the retrieved information can all influence the precise location and pattern 
of activity in the hippocampus and other medial temporal lobe structures (Viard et al., 2012).  
Moreover, lesion studies have provided contrasting evidence regarding the question of whether 
hippocampal damage alone is sufficient to produce a deficit in future simulation or imagining 
novel scenes. Addis and Schacter (2012) suggested that three different simulation-related 
processes rely to some extent on the hippocampus: 1) providing access to details stored in 
memory that are relevant to a constructed scenario; 2) recombining these details into a 
spatiotemporal context; and 3) encoding a simulation into memory so that it can influence and 
guide future behaviors. Addis and Schacter (2012) further noted that these processes might 
depend on regional differences within the hippocampus, which could also be relevant to some of 
the inconsistencies noted in the literature.   
Much remains to be done to clarify the role of the hippocampus and other structures in 
imagination and future simulation. It will be important for this neurally-focused work to take 
account of behavioral studies that are beginning to tease apart the corresponding cognitive 
components of memory and simulation, some of which we have already discussed in this review 
(for recent examples, see Anderson, 2012; Anderson et al., 2012; Arnold et al., 2011a; 
D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; de Vito et al., 2012a; Pillemer et al., in press; Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008).  
The Default Network Can Couple Flexibly with Other Networks to Support Complex Goal-
Directed Simulations 
We have emphasized that the network of regions activated during remembering the past 
and imagining the future overlaps considerably with the default network, and also noted that the   29 
default network was initially identified by deactivations during externally-directed attention to 
visually presented stimuli compared with passive resting states (Raichle et al., 2001). This latter 
observation led investigators to suggest that the default network does not contribute to goal-
directed cognitive processing and that its activity might even be antithetical to goal-directed 
cognition (e.g., Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010; Park et al., 2010; Thomason et al., 2008). In 
line with these observations, Mason et al. (2007) reported fMRI evidence that default network 
activity showed significant increases as participants performed highly practiced working memory 
tasks characterized by frequent incidents of mind-wandering relative to novel task conditions. 
Increased activity in several default network regions during practiced (versus novel) tasks was 
positively correlated with self-reported tendencies to mind-wander. The finding that default 
network activity increased as participants mentally wandered “off task” supports the idea that 
this network does not and perhaps cannot support goal-directed cognition. From this perspective, 
the memories and future simulations associated with default network activity do not involve 
goal-directed cognition and instead represent cognitive activity akin to mind-wandering or 
daydreaming, consistent with the general notion that the default network does not contribute to 
goal-directed cognition. 
 Contrary to these ideas, recent evidence indicates that the default network can support 
goal-directed simulations. As already noted, default network activity has been reported when 
participants make decisions about self-relevant future scenarios that involved specific goals 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; D’Argembeau et al., 2010b). Spreng et al. (2010) examined goal-
directed cognition by devising an autobiographical planning task and compared activity during 
performance of a traditional visuospatial planning task, the Tower of London (e.g., Shallice, 
1982). In the latter task, participants were shown two configurations of discs on vertical rods in   30 
an “initial” and “goal” position, and they attempted to determine the minimum number of moves 
needed to match the configurations. The autobiographical planning task was visually matched to 
the Tower of London task but required participants to devise plans in order to meet specific goals 
in their personal futures. For example, freedom from debt constituted one of the goals in the 
autobiographical planning task. Participants viewed the goal and then saw two steps they could 
take toward achieving that goal (good job and save money) as well as an obstacle they needed to 
overcome in order to achieve the goal (have fun). They were instructed to integrate the steps and 
obstacles into a cohesive personal plan that would allow them to achieve the goal. 
Such goal-directed autobiographical planning engaged the default network. As shown in 
Figure 4, during the autobiographical planning task activity in the default network coupled with a 
distinct frontoparietal control network (e.g., Vincent et al., 2008; Niendam et al., 2012) that has 
been linked to executive control processes. By contrast, visuospatial planning during the Tower 
of London task engaged a third network – the dorsal attention network, which is known to 
increase its activity when attention to the external environment is required (e.g., Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002) – that also coupled with the frontoparietal control network. These results suggest 
that the default network can support goal-directed cognition of a particular kind, 
autobiographical planning, by co-operating with the frontoparietal control network, which 
appears capable of flexibly coupling with distinct networks depending on task demands. Spreng 
& Schacter (2012) replicated these results in young adults and extended them to older adults, 
also showing that during visuospatial planning, the elderly failed to suppress default network 
activity and that default activity in the elderly did not de-couple from the frontoparietal control 
network. Spreng et al. (in press) used measures of intrinsic functional connectivity and analyses 
based on graph theory to examine further the relations among the default, frontoparietal control,   31 
and dorsal attention networks. Converging with the results from task-based activation studies, 
Spreng et al. (in press) reported that whereas the default and dorsal attention networks exhibited 
little positive connectivity with one another, the frontoparietal control network showed a high 
degree of intrinsic connectivity with each of these networks (see also, Doucet et al., 2011). 
In a related task-based study, Gerlach et al. (2011) carried out fMRI scans while 
participants performed a goal-directed task in which they generated mental simulations in order 
to solve specific problems that arose in imaginary scenarios. For example, participants were 
asked to imagine being left alone in a friend's dorm room, and trying on their friend’s ring, which 
they could not remove. They received a cue word such as “soap” to help them imagine a solution 
to the problem. A contrast of brain activity during this task with activity during a semantic 
processing control task revealed that the simulation-based problem-solving task engaged several 
key regions within the default network, including medial prefrontal cortex and posterior 
cingulate, as well as a region of lateral prefrontal cortex that has been linked with executive 
processing. These key default and frontoparietal control structures behaved as a functional 
network in a multivariate functional connectivity analysis, coupling with regions in the default 
network including the hippocampus (Gerlach et al., 2011). 
Along similar lines, Ellamil et al. (2012) reported that when participants evaluated 
creative ideas they had generated in the scanner, default network regions coupled with executive 
regions, including lateral prefrontal cortex. Two additional studies demonstrated co-activation of 
the executive and default systems in a manner consistent with cross-network coupling. In both, 
information load modulated lateral prefrontal cortex while domain specific information 
modulated the default network. Meyer at al. (2012) reported that medial prefrontal and posterior 
cingulate activity was related to measures of social competence and social reasoning during a   32 
social working memory task, whereas lateral prefrontal activity increased as a function of the 
amount of social information required to be maintained. Summerfield et al. (2010) reported that 
regions including hippocampus and retrosplenial cortex were involved in integrating imagined 
objects into a scene, whereas activity in lateral prefrontal regions was dependent on the number 
of elements to be integrated. 
Recent fMRI evidence also shows that both default network and executive regions are co-
active and coupled during memory retrieval (Fornito et al., 2012; St. Jacques et al., 2011) and 
mind-wandering (Christoff, et al., 2009; Christoff, 2012). Further, people typically focus on the 
future and engage in extensive autobiographical planning during mind-wandering episodes 
(Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, et al., 2011), and these effects are most pronounced in 
individuals with high working memory capacity, a measure of executive processing (Baird et al., 
2011). These observations provide further evidence that the default network can couple with 
executive regions in the service of goal-directed cognition (for further discussion, see Schacter, 
2012; Smallwood et al., 2012; Spreng, 2012). 
Concluding Comments and Future Directions 
It should be clear from the material reviewed here that much has been learned about the 
relations among memory, imagination, and future thinking during the past several years. We 
conclude by noting a number of other emerging issues that we think are particularly suitable for 
additional study. 
 The tight linkage between remembering the past and imagining the future has led several 
investigators to propose that a key function of memory is to provide a basis for predicting the 
future via imagined scenarios and that the ability to flexibly recombine elements of past 
experience into simulations of novel future events is therefore an adaptive process (e.g., Boyer,   33 
2008; Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007). Although future 
simulations are subject to some pitfalls (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Schacter, 2012), several lines 
of research have begun to provide evidence for the functional-adaptive role of future simulations, 
including work on default network contributions to planning and problem solving discussed 
earlier (for review, see Schacter, 2012). An interesting parallel has also appeared in the field of 
machine learning, where significant advances have been made in planning through the 
deployment of Monte-Carlo tree search methods (e.g., Silver and Veness, 2010). These 
techniques make use of simulations of the future (“roll-outs”) to better evaluate situations and aid 
decision-making, and have been successfully used in a gaming context to train master level 
Computer Go programs (i.e, programs that play the board game Go). 
Another promising direction involves the simulation of emotional events and its relation 
to memory. It has been established that the ability to generate specific and detailed simulations of 
future events is associated with effective coping by enhancing the ability of individuals to engage 
in emotional regulation and appropriate problem-solving activities (Brown et al., 2002; Sheldon 
et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 1998). Numerous studies have also established that views of the future 
are associated with a prevalent positivity or optimism bias (Sharot, 2011), and fMRI evidence 
has linked this bias with reduced activity in brain regions associated with emotion, such as the 
amygdala and rostral anterior cingulate, during simulation of negative future scenarios versus 
simulation of positive future scenarios or memory for positive or negative past events (Sharot et 
al., 2007). These findings fit well with behavioral research showing a positivity bias when people 
remember simulations of positive, negative, and neutral future events: details associated with 
negative simulations are remembered more poorly over time compared with details associated 
with positive or neutral simulations (Szpunar et al., 2012; see also, Gallo et al., 2011). Emotional   34 
factors also play a role in the well-established finding that repeatedly simulating a future event 
makes that event seem more probable (for review of early studies, see Koehler, 1991). Szpunar 
and Schacter (in press) recently reported that after repeatedly simulating personal events that 
might occur in one’s future, the subjective plausibility of those events increases, but the effect 
was observed only for positive and negative events, and not for neutral events. Research 
investigating the neural basis of this cognitive bias could benefit from studies that have begun to 
examine the neural underpinnings of emotional simulations (e.g., D’Argembeau et al, 2008b; 
Sharot et al., 2007).   
Another promising domain centers on the phenomenon of temporal discounting: people 
typically devalue a future reward according to the extent of delay before the reward is delivered 
(Green & Myerson, 2004). Boyer (2008) argued that a key adaptive function of the ability to 
simulate future events based on past experience is to allow individuals to represent emotional 
aspects of future rewards in a way that overrides temporal discounting so as to produce less 
impulsive and more farsighted decisions. Two recent studies have shown that when people 
imagine experiencing a reward in the future, they show an increased tendency to favor rewards 
that produce greater long-term payoffs, thereby countering the normal tendency to devalue 
delayed rewards (Benoit et al., 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2010; for related results, see Mitchell et 
al., 2011). Moreover, the results of fMRI scanning carried out during this procedure showed that 
the effects of episodic simulation on temporal discounting are associated with increased coupling 
between activity in the hippocampus and prefrontal (Benoit et al., 2011) or anterior cingulate 
(Peters & Büchel, 2010) regions involved in reward-related processing. These findings could 
provide a basis for investigating effects of simulation on discounting, and its neural 
underpinnings, in populations prone to impulsive decision-making such as drug addicts (e.g.,   35 
Bechara, 2005). Importantly, Kwan et al. (2012) showed that the severely amnesic patient KC, 
who is unable to recall specific episodes from his personal past or imagine specific episodes in 
his personal future (Tulving, 1985), did not exhibit more impulsive decision-making than 
matched controls. The authors suggested that KC relies on his intact semantic memory when 
making decisions about the future. Clearly, developing a more complete understanding of the 
separate and possibly interacting influences of episodic and semantic memory processes for 
farsighted versus impulsive future decisions represents an important avenue for future research. 
These considerations also highlight the potentially important contributions made by 
semantic memory to imagining the future. We began this review by noting that we would focus 
primarily on episodic memory, and though there is little doubt that episodic memory plays a key 
role in imagining the future, it is also clear that semantic memory is highly relevant (Klein, in 
press; Martin-Ordas et al., 2012). For example, early work by Klein et al. (2002) examined the 
role of semantic memory in thinking about the future, and this link has been acknowledged by a 
number of investigators (e.g., Abraham et al., 2008a; Binder & Desai, 2011; Duval et al., 2012; 
Irish et al., 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010). Several 
recent findings, in addition to the work by Kwan et al. (2012) on temporal discounting, highlight 
ways in which semantic memory can contribute to imagining future episodes, including findings 
that a) patients with impaired semantic memory show a reduced ability to generate specific 
future episodes (Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012) and also show deficits in constructing 
semantic future scenarios (Duval et al., 2012), b) some default network regions are active during 
both episodic and semantic future thinking tasks (Abraham et al., 2008a), and c) general or 
semantic personal knowledge guides retrieval of episodic details during the construction of 
future events in healthy individuals, providing a basis for structuring and interpreting them   36 
(D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). Taken together, we think that 
these findings suggest that semantic memory plays an important role in the process of 
recombination, which has been emphasized as critical for constructing simulated scenarios, and 
thus believe that an important task will be to distinguish episodic and semantic contributions to 
the process of recombination. While it has been suggested that future thinking based on semantic 
memory may draw heavily on lateral and anterior temporal lobe regions (e.g., Addis et al. 2007, 
2011b; Irish et al., 2012), more direct investigations are needed. 
  Studies of remembering the past and imagining the future should benefit from establishing 
closer connections with work on narrative processing and the representation of non-personal 
fictional information. For example, the severely amnesic patient KC who, as noted earlier, has 
essentially no capacity for episodic memory or future simulation (Tulving, 1985) also exhibits 
deficits when attempting to generate non-personal fictional narratives (Rosenbaum et al., 2009). 
These findings are in line with fMRI evidence from Abraham et al. (2008b), who found that 
medial temporal lobe regions were active when participants made possible/impossible judgments 
about scenarios involving real people (e.g., Peter heard about George Bush on the radio 
yesterday) or fictional characters (e.g., Peter heard about Cinderella on the radio). A related line 
of evidence indicates that correlated reductions in the episodic specificity of remembering past 
events and imagining the future in older adults extend to the description of perceptually present 
pictures (Gaesser et al., 2011), perhaps involving age-related changes in narrative processing 
(LaBouvie-Vief & Blanchard-Fields, 1982; Trunk & Abrams, 2009), but much remains to be 
learned about the contribution of narrative processing to memory and imagination (e.g., Abelson, 
1981).  
  Finally, social and cognitive psychologists have done a great deal of research on the topic of   37 
counterfactual simulations – that is, constructing alternative versions of what could have 
happened in the past (e.g., Byrne, 2002; Epstude & Roese, 2008) – but few studies have 
examined the neural basis of such simulations (e.g., Barbey et al., 2009) or how they are related 
to simulating future events (e.g., De Brigard et al., in press). Neuroimaging evidence reviewed 
earlier (Addis et al., 2009a) indicates that many of the same regions are involved in imagining 
future and imagining past events, and recent fMRI evidence examining the construction of 
alternative outcomes to past events also implicates many regions in the default network (Van 
Hoeck et al., in press). Additional studies on the topic should be highly revealing.  
  At a more general level, research examining the relations among memory, imagination and 
future thinking has helped to broaden our conception of memory by bringing into focus the 
numerous ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning and by emphasizing the close 
link between memory and simulation. We believe that many valuable insights remain to be 
gained from further development of this promising approach.   38 
Acknowledgments 
 
Supported by grants from the National Institute on Aging (AG08441) and National Institute of 
Mental Health (MH060941) to DLS, Marsden Fund and Rutherford Discovery Fellowship 
Scheme to DRA, and Wellcome Trust to DH. We thank T. Fernando for help with preparation of 
the manuscript, and F. De Brigard, B. Gaesser, K. Gerlach, K. Madore, and P. St. Jacques for 
comments and discussion.  39 
References 
Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. Am. Psychol. 36, 715-729.  
Abraham, A., Schubotz, R.I., and von Cramon, D.Y. (2008a). Thinking about the future versus 
the past in personal and non-personal contexts. Brain Res. 1233, 106-119. 
Abraham, A., von Cramon, D.Y., and Schubotz, R.I. (2008b). Meeting George Bush versus 
meeting Cinderella: The neural response when telling apart what is real from what is fictional in 
the context of our reality. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20, 965-976. 
Addis, D. R., and Schacter, D. L. (2008). Constructive episodic simulation: Temporal distance 
and detail of past and future events modulate hippocampal engagement. Hippocampus 18, 227-
237. 
Addis, D.R., and Schacter, D.L. (2012). The hippocampus and imagining the future: Where do 
we stand? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5, Article 173. 
Addis, D.R., Wong, A.T., and Schacter, D.L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the 
future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. 
Neuropsychologia 45, 1363-1377. 
Addis, D.R., Wong, A.T., and Schacter, D.L. (2008). Age-related changes in the episodic 
simulation of future events. Psychol. Sci. 19, 33-41. 
Addis, D. R., Pan, L., Vu, M. A., Laiser, N., and Schacter, D. L. (2009a). Constructive episodic 
simulation of the future and the past: Distinct subsystems of a core brain network mediate 
imagining and remembering. Neuropsychologia 47, 2222-2238. 
Addis, D.R., Sacchetti, D.C., Ally, B.A., Budson, A.E., and Schacter, D.L. (2009b). Episodic 
simulation of future events is impaired in mild Alzheimer’s disease. Neuropsychologia 47, 2660-
2671.   40 
 
Addis, D.R., Musicaro, R., Pan, L., and Schacter, D.L. (2010). Episodic simulation of past and 
future events in older adults: Evidence from an experimental recombination task. Psychol. Aging 
25, 369-376. 
Addis, D.R., Cheng, T., Roberts, R.P., and Schacter, D.L. (2011a). Hippocampal contributions to 
the episodic simulation of specific and general future events. Hippocampus 21, 1045-1052. 
Addis, D.R., Roberts, R.P., and Schacter, D.L. (2011b). Age-related neural changes in 
remembering and imagining. Neuropsychologia 49, 3656-3669. 
Andelman, F., Hoofien, D., Goldberg, I., Aizenstein, O., and Neufeld, M.Y. (2010). Bilateral 
hippocampal lesion and a selective impairment of the ability for mental time travel. Neurocase 
16, 426-435. 
Anderson, R.J. (2012). Imagining novel futures: The roles of event plausibility and familiarity. 
Memory 20, 443-451.  
Anderson, R.J., and Dewhurst, S.A. (2009). Remembering the past and imagining the future: 
Differences in event specificity of spontaneously generated thought. Memory 17, 367-373. 
Anderson, R.J., Dewhurst, S.A., and Nash, R.A. (2012). Shared cognitive processes underlying 
past and future thinking: The impact of imagery and concurrent task demands on event 
specificity. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 38, 356-365. 
Andreasen, N.C., O’Leary, D.S., Cizadlo, T., Amdt, S., Rezai, K., Watkins, G.L., Ponto, L.L., 
and Hichwa, R.D. (1995). Remembering the past: Two facets of episodic memory explored with 
positron emission tomography. Am. J. Psychiatry 152, 1576-1585. 
Andrews-Hanna, J.R. (2012). The brain’s default network and its adaptive role in internal 
mentation. Neuroscientist 18, 251-270.   41 
 
Andrews-Hanna, J.R., Reidler, J.S., Huang, C., and Buckner, R.L. (2010a). Evidence for the 
default network’s role in spontaneous cognition. J. Neurophysiol. 104, 322-335. 
Andrews-Hanna, J.R., Reidler, J.S., Sepulcre, J., Poulin, R., and Buckner, R.L. (2010b). 
Functional-anatomic fractionation of the brain’s default network. Neuron 65, 550-562. 
Arnold, K.M., McDermott, K.B., and Szpunar, K.K. (2011a). Imagining the near and far future: 
The role of location familiarity. Mem. Cognit. 39, 954-967. 
Arnold, K.M., McDermott, K.B., and Szpunar, K.K. (2011b). Individual differences in time 
perspective predict autonoetic experience. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 712-719. 
Arzy, S., Molnar-Szakacs, I., and Blanke, O. (2008). Self in time: imagined self location 
influences neural activity related to mental time travel. J. Neurosci. 28, 6502–6507. 
Arzy, S., Collette, S., Ionta, S., Fornari, E., and Blanke, O. (2009). Subjective mental time: The 
functional architecture of projecting onself into the past and future. European J. Neurosci. 30, 
2009-2017.  
Atance, C. M., and O'Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 533-
539. 
Atance, C.M. and O’Neill, D.K. (2005) The emergence of episodic future thinking in humans. 
Learn. Motiv. 36 126-144, 
Baird, B., Schooler, J.W., and Smallwood, J. (2011). Back to the future: Autobiographical 
planning and the functionality of mind-wandering. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1604-1611. 
Bar, M. (2007). The proactive brain: Using analogies and associations to generate predictions. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 280-89 
Bar, M., and Aminoff, E. (2003). Cortical analysis of context. Neuron 38, 347-358.   42 
Barbey, A.K., Krueger, F., and Grafman, J. (2009). Structured event complexes in the medial 
prefrontal cortex support counterfactual representations for future planning. Philos. Trans. R. 
Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 1291-1300. 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Bechara, A. (2005). Decision-making, impulse control and loss of willpower to resist drugs: A 
neurocognitive perspective. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1458-1463. 
Benoit, R.G., Gilbert, S.J., and Burgess, P.W. (2011). A neural mechanism mediating the impact 
of episodic prospection on farsighted decisions. J. Neurosci. 31, 6771-6779. 
Bernsten, D., and Bohn, A. (2010). Remembering and forecasting: The relation between 
autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking. Mem. Cognit. 38, 265-278. 
Berryhill, M.E., Picasso, L., Arnold, R., Drowos, D., and Olson, I.R. (2010). Similarities and 
differences between parietal and frontal patients in autobiographical and constructed experience 
tasks. Neuropsychologia 48, 1385-1393. 
Binder, J.R., and Desai, R.H. (2011). The neurobiology of semantic memory. Trends Cogn. Sci. 
15, 527-536. 
Botzung, A., Denkova, E., and Manning, L. (2008). Experiencing past and future events: 
Functional neuroimaging evidence on the neural bases of mental time travel. Brain Cogn. 66, 
202-212. 
Boyer, P. Evolutionary economics of mental time travel? (2008). Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 219-224. 
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F. (2005). The Science of False Memory (New York, NY: Oxford  
University Press). 
   43 
Brown, A.D., Dorfman, M.L., Marmar, C.R., and Bryant, R.A. (2012). The impact of perceived 
self-efficacy on mental time travel and social problem solving. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 299-306. 
Brown, A.D., Root, J.C., Romano, T.A., Chang, L.J., Bryant, R.A., and Hirst, W. (in press). 
Overgeneralized autobiographical memory and future thinking in combat veterans with 
posttraumatic stress disorder. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry. 
Brown, G. P., MacLeod, A. K., Tata, P., and Goddard, L. (2002). Worry and the simulation of 
future outcomes. Anxiety Stress Coping 15, 1-17. 
Buckner, R.L. (2010). The role of the hippocampus in prediction and imagination. Annu. Rev. 
Psychol. 61, 27-48. 
Buckner, R. L., and Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cogn. Sci. 11, 
49-57. 
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). The brain's default network: 
Anatomy, function, and relevance to disease. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 1-38. 
Busby, J., and Suddendorf, T. (2005). Recalling yesterday and predicting tomorrow. Cogn. Dev. 
20, 362-372. 
Byrne, R.M. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 6, 426-431. 
Carhart-Harris, R.L., and Friston, K.J. (2010). The default-mode, ego-functions and free-energy: 
A neurobiological account of Freudian ideas. Brain 133, 1265-1283. 
Caruso, E.M. (2010). When the future feels worse than the past: A temporal inconsistency in 
moral judgment. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 139, 610-624. 
   44 
Caruso, E.M., Gilbert, D.T., and Wilson, T.D. (2008). A wrinkle in time: Asymmetric valuation 
of past and future events. Psychol. Sci. 19, 796-801. 
Caruso, E.M., Van Boven, L., Chin, M., and Ward, A. (in press). The Temporal Doppler effect: 
When the future feels closer than the past. Psychol. Sci. 
Cheke, L.G., and Clayton, N.S. (2010). Mental time travel in animals. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. 
Cogn. Sci. 1, 1-16. 
Christoff, K. (2012). Undirected thought: Neural determinants and correlates. Brain Res. 1428, 
51-59. 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A.M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R., and Schooler, J.W. (2009). Experience 
sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions to mind 
wandering. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106, 8719-8724. 
Clayton, N.S. and Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub 
jays. Nature 395, 272-274. 
Clayton, N.S., Bussey, T.J., & Dickinson, A. (2003). Can animals recall the past and plan for the 
future? Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 685-691. 
Conway, M.A., and Pleydell-Pearce, C.W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychol. Rev. 107, 261-288. 
Cooper, J.M., Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D.G., and Maguire, E.A. (2011). The effect of 
hippocampal damage in children on recalling the past and imagining new experiences. 
Neuropsychologia 49, 1843-1850. 
Corbetta, M., and Shulman, G.L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention 
in the brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3, 201-215. 
Crystal, J.D. (2012). Prospective cognition in rats. Learn. Motiv. 43, 181-191.   45 
D'Argembeau, A., and Van der Linden, M. (2004). Phenomenal characteristics associated with 
projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: Influence of valence and 
temporal distance. Conscious. Cogn. 13, 844-858. 
D'Argembeau, A., and Van der Linden, M. (2006). Individual differences in the phenomenology 
of mental time travel: The effect of vivid imagery and emotion regulation. Conscious. Cogn. 15, 
342-350. 
D’Argembeau, A., and Mathy, A. (2011). Tracking the construction of episodic future thoughts. 
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 140, 258-271. 
D’Argembeau, A., and Demblon, J. (2012). On the representational systems underlying 
prospection: Evidence from the event-cuing paradigm. Cognit. 125, 160-167. 
D'Argembeau, A., Raffard, S., and Van der Linden, M. (2008a). Remembering the past and 
imagining the future in schizophrenia. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 117, 247-251. 
D’Argembeau, A., Xue, G., Lu, Z.L., Van der Linden, M., and Bechara, A. (2008b). Neural 
correlates of envisioning emotional events in the near and far future. NeuroImage 40, 398-407. 
D’Argembeau, A., Ortoleva, C., Jumentier, S., and Van der Linden, M. (2010a). Component 
processes underlying future thinking. Mem. Cognit. 38, 809-819. 
D’Argembeau, A., Stawarcyk, D., Majerus, S., Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Feyers, D., 
Maquet, P., and Salmon, E. (2010b). The neural basis of personal goal processing when 
envisioning future events. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1701-1713. 
D’Argembeau, A., Renaud, O., and Van der Linden, M. (2011). Frequency, characteristics, and 
functions of future-oriented thoughts in daily life. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35, 96-103. 
D’Argembeau, A., Lardi, C., and Van der Linden, M. (2012). Self-defining future projections: 
Exploring the identity function of thinking about the future. Memory 20, 110-120.   46 
Dalla Barba, G, and Boissé, M-F. (2010). Temporal consciousness and confabulation: Is the 
medial temporal lobe “temporal”? Cogn. Neuropsychiatry 15, 95-117. 
De Brigard, F. & Giovanello, K.S. (2012) Influence of outcome valence in the subjective 
experience of episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1085-1096. 
De Brigard, F., Szpunar, K.K., & Schacter, D.L. (in press). Coming to grips with the past: 
Effects of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual thoughts. 
Psychol. Sci. 
de Vito, S., Gamboz, N., and Brandimonte, M.A. (2012a). What differentiates episodic future 
thinking from complex scene imagery? Conscious. Cogn. 21, 813-823. 
de Vito, S., Gamboz, N., Brandimonte, M.A., Barone, P., Amboni, M., and Della Sala, S. 
(2012b). Future thinking in Parkinson’s disease: An executive function? Neuropsychologia 50, 
1494-1501. 
Doucet, G., Naveau, M., Petit, L., Delcroix, N., Zago, L., Crivello, F., Jobard, G., Tzourio-
Mazoyer, N., Mazoyer, B., Mellet, E., and Joliot, M. (2011). Brain activity at rest: A multiscale 
hierarchical functional organization. J. Neurophysiol. 105, 2753-2763. 
Duval, C., Desgranges, B., de La Sayette, V., Belliard, S., Eustache, F., and Piolino, P. (2012).  
What happens to personal identity when semantic knowledge degrades? A study of the self and 
autobiographical memory in semantic dementia. Neuropsychologia. 50, 254-265. 
Eacott, M.J. and Easton, A. (2012). Remembering the past and thinking about the future: Is it 
really about time? Learn. Motiv. 43, 200-208. 
Eichenbaum, H.E., and Cohen, N.J. (2001). From Conditioning to Conscious Recollection: 
Memory Systems of the Brain (New York: Oxford University Press).   47 
Ellamil, M., Dobson, C., Beeman, M., and Christoff, K. (2012). Evaluative and generative modes 
of thought during the creative process. NeuroImage 59, 1783-1794. 
Emery, N. and Clayton, N.S. (2001). Effects of experience and social context on prospective 
caching strategies by scrub jays. Nature 414, 443-446 
Epstude, K., and Roese, N.J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. Pers. Soc. 
Psychol. Rev. 12, 168-192. 
Fornito A., Harrison B.J., Zalesky A., and Simons J.S. (2012). Competitive and cooperative 
dynamics of large-scale brain functional networks supporting recollection. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 
USA. 109, 12788-12793. 
Gaesser, B., Sacchetti, D.C., Addis, D.R., and Schacter, D.L. (2011). Characterizing age-related 
changes in remembering the past and imagining the future. Psychol. Aging 26, 80-84. 
Gallo, D.A., Korthauer, L.E., McDonough, I.M., Teshale, S., and Johnson, E.L. (2011). Age-
related positivity effects and autobiographical memory detail: Evidence from a past-future source 
memory task. Memory 19, 641-652. 
Gamboz, N., Brandimonte, M.A., and De Vito, S. (2010a). The role of past in the simulation of 
autobiographical future episodes. Exp. Psychol. 57, 419-428. 
Gamboz, N., De Vito, S., Brandimonte, M.A., Pappalardo, S., Galeone, F., Iavarone, A., and 
Della Sala, S. (2010b). Episodic future thinking in amnesic mild cognitive impairment. 
Neuropsychologia 48, 2091-2097. 
Gerlach, K. D., Spreng, R. N., Gilmore, A. W., and Schacter, D. L. (2011). Solving future 
problems: Default network and executive activity associated with goal-directed mental 
simulations. NeuroImage 55, 1816-1824.   48 
Gilbert, D.T., and Wilson, T.D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. Science 317, 1351-
1354. 
Green, L., and Myerson, J. (2004). A discounting framework for choice with delayed and 
probabilistic rewards. Psychol. Bull. 130, 769-792. 
Grill-Spector, K., Henson, R., and Martin, A. (2006). Repetition and the brain: Neural models of 
stimulus-specific effects. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 14-23. 
Gusnard, D.A., Akbudak, E., Shulman, G.L., and Raichle, M.E. (2001). Medial prefrontal cortex 
and self-referential mental activity: Relation to a default mode of brain function. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci. USA 98, 4259-4264. 
Hardt, O., Einarsson, E.O., and Nader, K. (2010). A bridge over troubled water: Reconsolidation 
as a link between cognitive and neuroscientific memory research traditions. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 
61, 141-167. 
Hassabis, D., and Maguire, E. A. (2007). Deconstructing episodic memory with construction. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 299-306. 
Hassabis, D., and Maguire, E.A. (2009). The construction system of the brain. Philos. Trans. R. 
Soc. B Biol. Sci. 364, 1263-1271. 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., and Maguire, E. A. (2007a). Using imagination to understand the 
neural basis of episodic memory. J. Neurosci. 27, 14365-14374. 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, D. S., and Maguire, E. A. (2007b). Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 104, 1726-1731. 
Hayne, H., and Imuta, K. (2011). Episodic memory in 3- and 4-year-old children. Dev. 
Psychobiol. 53, 317-322.   49 
Howe, M.L. (2011). The adaptive nature of memory and its illusions. Current Directions 
Psychol. Sci. 20, 312-315. 
Hudson, J.A., Mayhew, E.M., and Prabhakar, J. (2011). The development of episodic foresight: 
Emerging concepts and methods. Adv. Child Dev. Behav. 40, 95-137. 
Hurley, N.C., Maguire, E.A., and Vargha-Khadem, F. (2011). Patient HC with developmental 
amnesia can construct future scenarios. Neuropsychologia 49, 3620-3628. 
Ingvar, D. H. (1979). Hyperfrontal distribution of the cerebral grey matter flow in resting 
wakefulness: On the functional anatomy of the conscious state. Acta Neurol. Scand. 60, 12-25. 
Ingvar, D. H. (1985). "Memory of the future": An essay on the temporal organization of 
conscious awareness. Hum. Neurobiol. 4, 127-136. 
Irish, M., Addis, D.R., Hodges, J.R., and Piguet, O. (2012). Considering the role of semantic 
memory in episodic future thinking: Evidence from semantic dementia. Brain 135, 2178-2191. 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., and Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychol. Bull. 
114, 3-28. 
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A. G., & Raye, C. L. (1988). Phenomenal characteristics 
of memories for perceived and imagined autobiographical events. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 117, 
371-376. 
Johnson S.C., Baxter L.C., Wilder L.S., Pipe J.G., Heiserman J.E., Prigatano G.P. (2002). Neural 
correlates of self-reflection. Brain 125, 1808–1814. 
Kelley, W.M., Macrae, C.N., Wyland, C.L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., and Heatherton, T.F. (2002). 
Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 785-794.   50 
Kim, H. (2012). A dual-subsystem model of the brain’s default network: Self-referential 
processing, memory retrieval processes, and autobiographical memory retrieval. NeuroImage. 
61, 712-714. 
Klein, S.B. (in press). The complex act of projecting onself into the future. Wiley Interdiscip. 
Rev. Cogn. Sci.  
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., and Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: The 
effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to remember the past and imagine 
the future. Soc. Cogn. 20, 353-379. 
Klein, S.B., Robertson, T.E., and Delton, A.W. (2010). Facing the future: Memory as an evolved 
system for planning future acts. Mem. Cognit. 38, 13-22. 
Koehler, D.J. (1991). Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment. Psychol. Bull. 110, 
499-419. 
Kosslyn, S.M., Ganis, G, and Thompson, W.L. (2001). Neural foundations of imagery. Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 2, 635-642. 
Kwan, D., Carson, N., Addis, D.R., and Rosenbaum, R.S. (2010). Deficits in past remembering 
extend to future imagining in a case of developmental amnesia. Neuropsychologia 48, 3179-
3186. 
Kwan, D., Craver, C.F., Green, L., Myerson, J., Boyer, P., and Rosenbaum, R.S. (2012). Future 
decision-making without episodic mental time travel. Hippocampus 22, 1215-1219. 
Labouvie-Vief, G., and Blanchard-Fields, F. (1982). Cognitive ageing and psychological growth. 
Ageing Soc. 2, 183-209.   51 
Levine, B., Svoboda, E., Hay, J.F., Winocur, G., and Moscovitch, M. (2002). Aging and 
autobiographical memory: Dissociating episodic from semantic retrieval. Psychol. Aging 17, 
677-689. 
Lind, S.E., and Bowler, D.M. (2010). Episodic memory and episodic future thinking in adults 
with autism. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 19, 896-905. 
Loftus, E.F. (1979). Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Loftus, E. F. (2003). Make-believe memories. Am. Psychol, 58, 867-873. 
Maguire, E.A., Vargha-Khadem, F., and Hassabis, D. (2010). Imagining fictitious and future 
experiences: Evidence from developmental amnesia. Neuropsychologia 48, 3187-3192. 
Maguire, E.A., and Hassabis, D. (2011). Role of the hippocampus in imagination and future 
thinking. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, E39. 
Martin, V.C., Schacter, D.L., Corballis, M.C., and Addis, D.R. (2011). A role for the 
hippocampus in encoding simulations of future events. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 13858-
13863. 
Martin-Ordas, G., Atance, C.M., & Louw, A. (2012). The role of episodic and semantic memory 
in episodic foresight. Learn. Motiv. 43, 209-219. 
Mason, M.F., Norton, M.I., Van Horn, J.D., Wegner, D.M., Grafton, S.T., Macrae, C.N. (2007). 
Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent thought. Science 315, 393-
395. 
McDonough, I.M., and Gallo, D.A. (2010). Separating past and future autobiographical events in 
memory: Evidence for a reality monitoring asymmetry. Mem. Cognit. 38, 3-12.   52 
Meyer, M.L., Spunt, R.P., Berkman, E.T., Taylor, S.E., and Lieberman, M.D. (2012). Evidence 
for social working memory from a parametric functional MRI study. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 
109, 1883-1888. 
Mitchell, J.P., Schirmer, J., Ames, D.L., and Gilbert, D.T. (2011). Medial prefrontal cortex 
predicts intertemporal choice. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 857-866. 
Morewedge, C.K., Gilbert, D.T., and Wilson, T.D. (2005). The least likely of times: How 
remembering the past biases forecasts of the future. Psychol. Sci. 16, 626-630. 
Mullally, S.L., Hassabis, D., and Maguire, E.A. (2012). Scene construction in amnesia: An fMRI 
study. J. Neurosci. 32, 5646-5653. 
Newman, E. J., & Lindsay, S. D. (2009). False memories:  What the hell are they for? Applied 
Cognit. Psychol. 23, 1105-1121. 
Niendam, T.A., Laird, A.R., Ray, K.L., Dean, Y.M., Glahn, D.C., and Carter, C.S. (2012). Meta-
analytic evidence for a superordinate cognitive control network subserving diverse executive 
functions. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 12, 241-268. 
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., and Panksepp, J. (2006). 
Self-referential processing in our brain—a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. 
NeuroImage 31, 440-457. 
Nyberg, L., Kim, A.S., Habib, R., Levine, B., and Tulving, E. (2010). Consciousness of 
subjective time in the brain. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 22356-22359. 
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., Kawashima, R., Fukuda, H., 
Itoh, M., and Yamadori, A. (2003). Thinking of the future and past: The roles of the frontal pole 
and the medial temporal lobes. NeuroImage 19, 1369-1380.   53 
Østby, Y., Walhovd, K.B., Tamnes, C.K., Grydeland, H., Tjelta Westyle, L., Fjell, A.M. (in 
press). Mental time travel and default-mode network functional connectivity in the developing 
brain. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA.  
Park, D.C., Polk, T.A., Hebrank, A.C.,  and Jenkins, L.J. (2010). Age differences in default mode 
activity on easy and difficult spatial judgment tasks. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 3, 1-12. 
Peters, J., and Büchel, C. (2010). Episodic future thinking reduces reward delay discounting 
through an enhancement of prefrontal-mediotemporal interactions. Neuron 66, 138-148. 
PIllemer, D.B., Thomsen, D., Kuwabara, K.J., and Ivcevic, Z. (in press). Feeling good and bad 
about the past and future self. Memory.  
Quoidbach, J., Hansenne, M., and Mottet, C. (2008). Personality and mental time travel: A 
differential approach to autonoetic consciousness. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 1082-1092. 
Race, E., Keane, M.M., and Verfaellie, M. (2011). Medial temporal lobe damage causes deficits 
in episodic memory and episodic future thinking not attributable to deficits in narrative 
construction. J. Neurosci. 31, 10262-10269. 
Raichle, M.E., MacLeod, A.M., Snyder, A.Z., Powers, W.J., Gusnard, D.A., and Shulman, G.L. 
(2001). A default mode of brain function. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98, 676-682. 
Rendell, P.G., Bailey, P.E., Henry, J.D., Phillips, L.H., Gaskin, S., and Kliegel, M. (in press). 
Older adults have greater difficulty imagining future rather than atemporal experiences. Psychol. 
Aging.  
Roberts, W.A. (2012). Future cognition in animals. Learn. Motiv. 43, 169-180. 
Roediger, H.L., Dudai, Y., and Fitzpatrick, S.M. (2007). Science of Memory: Concepts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).   54 
Romero, K. & Moscovitch, M. (2012).  Episodic memory and event construction in aging and 
amnesia. J. Mem. Lang. 67, 270-284.  
Rosenbaum, R.S., Stuss, D.T., Levine, B., and Tulving, E. (2007). Theory of mind is 
independent of episodic memory. Science 318, 1257. 
Rosenbaum, R.S., Gilboa, A., Levine, B., Winocur, G., and Moscovitch, M. (2009). Amnesia as 
an impairment of detail generation and binding: Evidence from personal, fictional, and semantic 
narratives in K.C. Neuropsychologia 47, 2181-2187. 
Russell, J., Alexis, D., and Clayton, N.S. (2010). Episodic future thinking in 3- to 5-year-old 
children: The ability to think of what will be needed from a different point of view. Cognition 
114, 56-71. 
Schacter, D.L. (2001). The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers 
(Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin). 
Schacter, D.L. (2012). Adaptive constructive processes and the future of memory. Am. Psychol., 
67, 603-613. 
Schacter, D. L., and Addis, D. R. (2007a). The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: 
Remembering the past and imagining the future. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 362, 
773-786. 
Schacter, D.L., and Addis, D.R. (2007b). The ghosts of past and future. Nature 445, 27. 
Schacter, D.L., and Addis, D.R. (2009). On the nature of medial temporal contributions to the 
constructive simulation of future events. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 364, 1245-1253. 
Schacter, D.L., and Slotnick, S.D. (2004). The cognitive neuroscience of memory distortion.  
Neuron 44, 149-160.   55 
Schacter, D.L., Norman, K.A., and Koutstaal, W. (1998). The cognitive neuroscience of 
constructive. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 49, 289-318.  
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2007a). The prospective brain: Remembering 
the past to imaging the future. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 657-661. 
Schacter, D.L., Wig, G.S., and Stevens, W.D. (2007b). Reductions in cortical activity during 
priming. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 17, 171-176. 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation of future events: 
Concepts, data, and applications. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 39-60. 
Schacter, D.L., Guerin, S.A., and St. Jacques, P.L. (2011). Memory distortion: An adaptive 
perspective. Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 467-474. 
Schacter, D.L., Gaesser, B., and Addis, D.R. (in press). Remembering the past and imagining the 
future in the elderly. Gerontology.  
Schmitz, T.W., and Johnson, S.C. (2007). Relevance to self: A brief review and framework of 
neural systems underlying appraisal. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 31, 585-596. 
Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 
298, 199-209. 
Sharot, T., Riccardi, A.M., Raio, C.M., and Phelps, E.A. (2007). Neural mechanisms mediating 
optimism bias. Nature 450, 102-105. 
Sharot, T. (2011). The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (New York: 
Vintage Books). 
Sheldon, S., McAndrews, M.P., and Moscovitch, M. (2011). Episodic memory processes 
mediated by the medial temporal lobes contribute to open-ended problem solving. 
Neuropsychologia 49, 2439-2447.   56 
Shulman, G.L., Fiez, J.A., Corbetta, M., Buckner, R.L., Miezen, F.M., Raichle, M.E., and 
Petersen, S.E. (1997). Common blood flow changes across visual tasks: II: Decreases in cerebral 
cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 648-663. 
Silver, D., and Veness, J. (2010). Monte Carlo planning in large POMPDS. In 24
th Advances in 
Neural Information Processing Systems, 2164-2172. 
Smallwood, J., Brown, K.S., Baird, B., and Schooler, J.W. (2012). Cooperation between the 
default mode network and the frontal-parietal network in the production of an internal train of 
thought. Brain. Res. 1428, 60-70. 
Spreng, R.N. (2012). The fallacy of a “task-negative” network. Front. Psychol., 3, 145. 
Spreng, R. N., & Grady, C. L. (2010). Patterns of brain activity supporting autobiographical 
memory, prospection, and theory-of-mind and their relationship to the default mode network. J. 
Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1112-1123. 
Spreng, R. N., and Levine, B. (2006). The temporal distribution of past and future 
autobiographical events across the lifespan. Mem. Cognit. 34, 1644-1651. 
Spreng, R.N. & Levine, B. (in press). Doing what we imagine: Completion rates and frequency 
attributes of imagined future events one year after prospection. Memory.  
Spreng, R. N., Mar, R. A., and Kim, A. S. (2009). The common neural basis of autobiographical 
memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind and the default mode: A quantitative meta-
analysis. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 489-510. 
Spreng, R.N., Stevens, W.D., Chamberlain, J.P., Gilmore, A.W., and Schacter, D.L. (2010). 
Default network activity, coupled with the frontoparietal control network, supports goal-directed 
cognition. NeuroImage 31, 303-317.   57 
Spreng, R.N., and Schacter, D.L. (2012). Default network modulation and large-scale network 
interactivity in healthy young and old adults. Cereb. Cortex 22, 2610-2621. 
Spreng, R.N., Sepulcre, J., Turner, G.R., Stevens, W.D., & Schacter, D.L. (in press). Intrinsic 
architecture underlying the relations among the default, dorsal attention, and frontoparietal 
control networks of the human brain. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 
Squire, L.R., van der Horst, A.S., McDuff, S.G., Franscino, J.C., Hopkins, R.O., and Mauldin, 
K.N. (2010). Role of the hippocampus in remembering the past and imagining the future. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 19044-19048. 
Squire, L.R., McDuff, S.G., and Frascino, J.C. (2011). Reply to Maguire and Hassabis: 
Autobiographical memory and future imagining. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, E40. 
St. Jacques, P.L., Kragel, P.A., and Rubin D.C. (2011). Dynamic neural networks supporting 
memory retrieval. NeuroImage 57, 608-616. 
Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S., Maj, M., Van der Linden, M., & D'Argembeau, A. (2011). 
Mindwandering: Phenomenology and function as assessed with a novel experience sampling 
method. Acta Psychologica 136, 370-381. 
Storm, B.C., and Jobe, T.A. (2012). Remembering the past and imagining the future: Examining 
the consequences of mental time travel on memory. Memory 20, 224-235. 
Suddendorf, T., and Corballis, M. C. (1997). Mental time travel and the evolution of the human 
mind. Genet. Soc. Gen. Psychol. Monogr. 123, 133-167. 
Suddendorf, T., and Busby, J. (2005). Making decisions with the future in mind: Developmental 
and comparative identification of mental time travel. Learn. Motiv. 36, 110-125. 
Suddendorf, T., and Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What is mental time 
travel, and is it unique to humans? Behav. Brain Sci. 30, 299-313.   58 
Suddendorf, T. (2010a). Linking yesterday and tomorrow: Preschoolers’ ability to report 
temporally displaced events. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 28, 491-498. 
Suddendorf, T. (2010b). Episodic memory versus episodic foresight: Similarities and differences. 
Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Cogn. Sci. 1, 99-107. 
Summerfield, J.J., Hassabis, D., and Maguire, E.A. (2010). Differential engagement of brain 
regions within a ‘core’ network during scene construction. Neuropsychologia 48, 1501-1509. 
Svoboda, E., and Levine, B. (2009). The effects of rehearsal on the functional neuroanatomy of 
episodic autobiographical and semantic remembering: A functional magnetic resonance imaging 
study. J. Neurosci. 29, 3073-3082. 
Szpunar, K.K., Watson, J.M., and McDermott, K.B. (2007). Neural substrates of envisioning the 
future. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 104, 642-647. 
Szpunar, K. K., and McDermott, K. B. (2008). Episodic future thought and its relation to 
remembering: Evidence from ratings of subjective experience. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 330-334. 
Szpunar, K. K., Chan, J. C. K., and McDermott, K. B. (2009). Contextual processing in episodic 
future thought. Cereb. Cortex 19, 1539-1548. 
Szpunar, K.K. (2010). Episodic future thought: An emerging concept. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 5, 
142-162. 
Szpunar, K.K. (2011). On subjective time. Cortex 47, 409-411. 
Szpunar, K.K., Addis, D.R., and Schacter, D.L. (2012). Memory for emotional simulations: 
Remembering a rosy future. Psychol. Sci. 23, 24-29. 
Szpunar, K.K., and Schacter, D.L. (in press). Get real: Effects of repeated simulation and 
emotion on the perceived plausibility of future experiences. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.   59 
Taylor, S. E., and Schneider, S. K. (1989). Coping and the simulation of events. Soc. Cogn. 7, 
174-194. 
Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., and Armor, D. A. (1998). Harnessing the imagination: 
Mental simulation, self-regulation, and coping. Am. Psychol. 53, 429-439. 
Thomason, M.E., Chang, C.E., Glover, G.H., Gabrieli, J.D., and Gotlib, I.H. (2008). Default-
mode function and task-induced deactivation have overlapping brain substrates in children. 
NeuroImage, 41, 1493-1503. 
Trope, Y., and Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychol. Rev. 110, 401-421. 
Trunk, D.L., and Abrams, L. (2009). Do younger and older adults’ communicative goals 
influence off-topic speech in autobiographical narratives? Psychol. Aging 24, 324-337. 
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of Episodic Memory (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Can. Psychol. 26, 1-12. 
Tulving, E. (2002a). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 53, 1-25. 
Tulving, E. (2002b). Chronesthesia: Awareness of subjective time. In Principles of Frontal Lobe 
Function, D. T. Stuss and R. C. Knight, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 311-325. 
Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human? In The Missing Link in 
Cognition: Origins of Self-reflective Consciousness, H.S. Terrace and J. Metcalfe, eds. (New 
York: Oxford University Press), pp. 3-56. 
Van Boven, L., and Ashworth, L. (2007). Looking forward, looking back: Anticipation is more 
evocative than retrospection. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 136, 289-300. 
van der Meer, M., Kurth-Nelson, Z., and Redish, A.D. (2012). Information processing in 
decision-making systems. Neuroscientist 18, 342-359.   60 
Van Hoeck, N., Ma, N., Ampe, L., Baetens, K., Vanderkerchove, M., and Van Overwalle, F. (in 
press). Counterfactual thinking: An fMRI study of changing the past for a better future. Soc. 
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci.  
Viard, A., Desgranges, B., Eustache, F., and Piolino, P. (2012). Factors affecting medial 
temporal lobe engagement for past and future episodic events: An ALE meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies. Brain Cogn. 80, 111-125.  
Viard A., Chetelat, G., Lebreton, K., Desgranges, B., Landeau, B., de La Sayette, V., Eustache, 
F., and Piolino, P. (2011). Mental time travel into the past and the future in healthy aged adults: 
An fmri study. Brain Cogn. 75, 1-9. 
Vincent, J.L., Kahn, I., Snyder, A.Z., Raichle, M.E., and Buckner, R.L. (2008). Evidence for a 
frontoparietal control system revealed by intrinsic functional connectivity. J. Neurophysiol. 100, 
3328-3342. 
Weiler, J.A., Suchan, B., and Daum, I. (2010a). When the future becomes the past: Differences 
in brain activation patterns for episodic memory and episodic future thinking. Behav. Brain Res. 
212, 196-203. 
Weiler, J.A., Suchan, B., and Daum, I. (2010b). Foreseeing the future: Occurrence probability of 
imagined future events modulates hippocampal activation. Hippocampus 20, 685-690. 
Weiler, J.A., Suchan, B., Koch, B., Schwarz, M., and Daum, I. (2011). Differential impairment 
of remembering the past and imagining novel events after thalamic lesions. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 
23, 3037-3051. 
Wheeler, M. A., Stuss, D. T., and Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of episodic memory: The 
frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychol. Bull. 121, 331-354.   61 
Williams, J. M. G., Ellis, N. C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., and MacLeod, A. K. (1996). The 
specificity of autobiographical memory and imaginability of the future. Mem. Cognit. 24, 116-
125. 
   62 
Figure captions 
Figure 1  A subsystem of brain regions is more active when participants imagine events in 
either the past or future, relative to when they remember real past events or complete a control 
task. The regions in which activation is associated with the past and future imagine tasks (warm 
colors) or control and past-recall tasks (cool colors) are shown 8-10 s after trial onset, 
superimposed over a standard MRI template at a threshold of p < .001. The line graph illustrates 
the weighted average of activation across all voxels associated with a particular condition across 
the length of the experimental tasks. Adapted from Addis et al. (2009a).  
Figure 2  Patients with semantic dementia show a selective deficit for imagining future 
events while displaying intact episodic memory. The difference in the number of internal 
episodic details generated for past and future events is plotted for healthy controls and semantic 
dementia patients; this difference is larger for the patients than controls. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. Voxel-based morphometry analyses indicate that this deficit in episodic 
future thinking is related to changes in grey matter intensity in the left inferior temporal gyrus 
and right temporal pole. Clusters are shown at a threshold of p < .001 and overlaid on the 
Montreal Neurological Institute standard brain. Adapted from Irish et al. (2012). 
Figure 3  Two components of the default network (adapted from Hassabis et al. 2007a). (A) 
A selection of sagittal, coronal and axial views of the “scene construction” subnetwork overlaid 
on “glass brain” and structural images (p < .001). This network includes the hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial and posterior parietal cortices and medial PFC, and 
supports the generation and maintenance of a complex and coherent scene or event. (B) Real 
memories are usually more self-relevant and familiar than imagined experiences. When these 
two types of simulation were directly contrasted in a well-controlled fMRI paradigm the   63 
precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and anterior medial PFC were found to be preferentially 
engaged for real memories (see also D’Argembeau et al. 2010b). This network is often referred 
to as the “self-reflection” network (Johnson et al. 2002). 
Figure 4  Network coupling. (A) Intrinsic connectivity maps depicting the default (blue), 
dorsal attention (red) and frontoparietal control (green) networks of the brain. Task-related 
BOLD signal change during planning within each intrinsic connectivity network: (B) default 
network, (C) dorsal attention network, (D) frontoparietal control network (* significant 
difference from baseline). (E) Frontoparietal control network coupling is modulated by domain 
of planning task. Frontoparietal control network activity is coupled with the default network, and 
decoupled from the dorsal attention network, during autobiographical planning. Frontoparietal 
control network activity is coupled with the dorsal attention network, and decoupled from the 
default network, during visuospatial planning. Adapted from Spreng et al. (2010).   64 
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